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Captive supplies have been a contentious issue in the livestock industry for fifteen years and the 
subject of both theoretical and empirical research.  In 2001, mandatory price reporting was 
implemented.  One objective by its proponents was to increase the amount of information 
available on captive supplies.  This paper examines data now available as a result of mandatory 
price reporting to determine what additional information is available compared to previously.  
Second, several models were specified and estimated to determine the impacts captive supplies 
had on fed cattle prices in the two years following implementation of mandatory price reporting.  
Models showed mixed results.  There was a consistent negative effect on cash market prices from 
formula priced trades; generally a positive impact from negotiated trades and packer owned 
trades on cash market prices; and mixed but often a positive impact from forward contract 
trades on cash market prices.  
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Captive supplies in fed cattle procurement have been a major concern and divisive issue in the 
beef industry for fifteen years.  Issues related to captive supplies were among the reasons many 
producers supported Congressional legislation to impose mandatory price reporting on packers.  
Alleged sweetheart deals offered only to selected large feedlots by large packers were thought to 
unfairly harm smaller cattle feeders.  Limited data and information on how packers procure fed 
cattle were believed to hinder cattle feeders in price discovery.  As a result, there was a push to 
move from voluntary to mandatory price reporting. 
 
Implementation of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act, hereafter referred to as mandatory 
price reporting (MPR), began April 3, 2001.  One effect of the Act was to create new data series 
on pricing of fed cattle, some of which pertain to captive supplies. This paper presents 
information on volume trends for pricing fed cattle and what can be learned about captive 
supplies and their impacts from the new mandatory price reports with two years of data since the 
Act was implemented.  Specifically, this article addresses two questions.  First, what can be 
learned from the new data generated under MPR?  This question pertains to the extent and 
pattern of captive supplies relative to what we knew prior to MPR.  Second, what cash market 
price impacts (if any) can be estimated from captive supplies data now available with MPR? 
 
Captive Supplies Before Mandatory Price Reporting Data 
Captive supplies refer to slaughter livestock that are committed to a specific buyer (meatpacker) 
two weeks or more in advance of slaughter.  The three most common types of captive supply 
methods include marketing/purchasing agreements, forward contracts, and packer feeding. 
 
Prior to MPR legislation, official data on captive supplies came from the Grain Inspection, 
Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA).  GIPSA required packers to report their captive supplies by captive supply method and month beginning in 1988.  Annual average 
captive supplies ranged from 18 to 24% of fed cattle slaughter for the four largest beefpacking 
firms between 1988 and 1998 (GIPSA 2003). Marketing agreements and forward contracts 
accounted for 14-19%; and packer feeding, 3-6% during that period.  GIPSA reported higher 
percentages for the three most recent reporting years based on audits of packer records and 
clarification of definitions for various captive supply arrangements (GIPSA 2002).  Total captive 
supplies for the four largest packers were 32-43% for 1999-2001.  Marketing agreements and 
forward contracts increased to 24-32%, while packer feeding increased to 8-11% (GIPSA 2003).  
GIPSA cautions that the audited figures for 1999-2001 are not comparable to previous year 
figures.  
 
As Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) reporters collected market price information for their 
voluntary market reports, they began collecting and reporting data on the non-cash-market 
shipment of fed cattle in 1994.  This series was called “additional movement” and became a 
proxy for some people for the extent of captive supplies.  However, while it included shipments 
of cattle that constitute captive supplies, it also included shipments of cattle priced by methods 
that may not constitute captive supplies, such as cattle priced on a grid but not part of a 
marketing agreement or contract.  The annual average percentage of additional movement of fed 
cattle (as reported by AMS) began slightly below the annual average of captive supply cattle (as 
reported by GIPSA) for 1994.  However, the percentage of additional movement cattle increased 
sharply. In 2000, the additional movement series averaged 42%, which was a few percentage 
points above the GIPSA captive supply percentage.  Recall, however, that the AMS data also 
included shipments that do not fit the GIPSA definition for captive supplies. 
 
Pricing Methods from Mandatory Price Reporting Data 
MPR made available data on various methods of pricing fed cattle.  Some of this data provides 
information on captive supplies.  Information in this section is presented about negotiated 
pricing, formula pricing, forward contracting, and packer owned cattle for the two years 
following implementation of MPR, which began April 3 2001. 
 
Negotiated pricing on average accounted for 44.7% of fed cattle marketings over the two-year 
period  (Table 1).  On a weekly basis, the percentage of negotiated pricing was as low as 24.5% 
and as high as 95.2%, which should be noted was for the first week of MPR.  Just over two-
thirds of negotiated priced fed cattle were sold on a live weight basis (67.4%) with the remaining 
32.6% sold on a dressed or carcass weight basis. 
 
Formula pricing accounted for 46.0% on average of fed cattle marketings over the two-year 
period.  This percentage varied widely also, ranging from a weekly low of 4.8%, also the first 
week of MPR, to a high of 64.8%.  Of formula priced trades, 94.4% were on a dressed weight 
basis and 5.6% on a live weight basis.  Nearly all formula pricing represents the method of 
determining the base price in a grid.  MPR data match closely with what cattle feeder 
respondents from Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas indicated in a 2002 survey (Schroeder et 
al. 2002).  In 2001, 45% of weighted average marketings by respondent feedlots were priced 
with a grid.  Of grid priced cattle, 35% of weighted average marketings were formula priced with 
the reference market being the cash market, either a quoted market price or a plant average price. 
 Forward contracting was the least used pricing alternative over the two-year period since MPR 
began.  On average, it accounted for 3.2% of fed cattle marketings and ranged on a weekly basis 
from a low of 0.2% to a high of 9.4%.  Of forward contract trades, 45.8% were on a live weight 
basis and 54.2% were on a dressed weight basis.  Survey data also indicated little use of forward 
contracts by cattle feeders in 2001 (Schroeder et al. 2002). 
 
Packer ownership of livestock is a contentious issue in itself (Bailey; Ward).  Prior to MPR, there 
was no on-going data series on the extent of packer ownership of fed cattle, only the annually 
reported figures by GIPSA which were compiled and released well after the year in which they 
occurred.  Thus, the series since MPR generates essentially new, more current information.  The 
extent of packer feeding was relatively stable over the two-year period since MPR began and 
consistent with the reported annual statistics by GIPSA.  Reported packer owned deliveries of 
fed cattle averaged 6.4% of fed cattle marketings for the two-year period.  The weekly 
percentage ranged from a low of 2.6% to a high of 10.2%. 
 
Is there more information available on captive supplies since mandatory price reporting than 
before?  A quick answer is yes, but as will be indicated here, the data do not present a clear 
picture of captive supplies.  MPR provides some additional information but likely less than many 
advocates of the legislation had expected.  Figure 1 shows weekly captive supply estimates from 
MPR.  Note, captive supplies as estimated here include formula priced trades, forward contracts, 
and packer owned fed cattle.  However, it should be noted that these categories do not compare 
exactly with the definitions used by GIPSA for captive supplies.  Formula priced cattle, while 
likely being primarily marketing agreement cattle, may include trades that occurred within two 
weeks of slaughter, thus not technically being part of captive supplies.  Therefore, summing 
these three categories (i.e., formula pricing, forward contracts, and packer owned marketings) 
from MPR data likely overstates captive supplies. 
 
In summary, MPR provided some weekly data on captive supplies that were not available 
previously.  Plus, since the data are reported weekly, it is much more timely than waiting a year 
or two for the monthly or annual reports by GIPSA.  However, it bears repeating that the data on 
captive supplies using mandatory price reports does not necessarily match the definition GIPSA 
has used for captive supplies.  Thus, there is more timely information and marginally better 
information on captive supplies since MPR, but the data have distinct limitations and probably 
the captive supply information is less than MPR advocates expected. 
 
Previous Conceptual Models and Empirical Estimates 
Previous research on captive supplies consists primarily of four conceptual/theoretical articles 
interspersed with four empirical studies.  Articles are discussed here in chronological order of 
publication. 
 
Elam first estimated the effects deliveries of captive supplies had on monthly average, fed cattle 
prices in the U.S. and in selected individual states (Texas, Kansas, Colorado, and Nebraska).  
Captive supply deliveries were inversely related to fed cattle prices over the period October 1988 
to May 1991.  For each 10,000 cattle delivered under captive supply arrangements, U.S. fed 
cattle prices declined by $0.03-$0.09/cwt., while for individual states results ranged from not 
significant to minus $0.37/cwt.  
Schroeder et al. (1993) collected transaction data from feedlots in southwestern Kansas during 
May-November 1990 to examine the relationship between forward contracting (including 
marketing agreements) and transaction prices for fed cattle.  They used two measures of forward 
contracts.  One was contract deliveries as a percentage of the weekly total.  The other was each 
packer’s share of contract deliveries for each week.  Results indicated a negative relationship 
between forward contracting and fed cattle prices, ranging from -$0.15 to -$0.31/cwt. over the 
six-month data period.  Impacts also varied for two-month sub-periods and for individual 
packers.  Price impacts were not significant for some packers and time periods. 
 
Some argued that early work estimating price effects from captive supplies lacked a strong 
theoretical framework identifying the motive(s) for beefpacking firms procuring fed cattle via 
captive supply methods.  Azzam (1996) developed a conceptual framework for arguing the 
monopsony-inefficiency motive for integration by beefpackers to capture fed cattle supplies.  He 
estimated the model empirically with aggregated, quarterly data for 1978-93.  While the estimate 
of vertical integration from the model exceeded the level believed to exist, the model provides 
plausible but not conclusive evidence of the monopsony-inefficiency motive.   
 
Azzam (1998) further developed a conceptual model for estimating the price effects from captive 
supplies, without incorporating a backward integration motive.  He found that price effects 
depend on a complex combination of several variables, among them the respective fraction of 
cash-market and captive-supply procured livestock supplies.  His model suggests that non-
competitive conduct is not a necessary condition for negative effects on cash prices from captive 
supplies.  In fact, Azzam argued previous work suggesting that the negative relationship between 
fed cattle prices and pre-committed supplies was due to non-competitive behavior was not 
defensible. 
 
The most extensive, detailed data to study price impacts from captive supplies were made 
available in a Congressionally mandated study on meatpacking concentration.  Ward, Koontz, 
and Schroeder estimated price impacts with alternative approaches.  They examined the 
interdependent nature of delivering cattle from three types of captive supply inventories and 
purchasing fed cattle in the cash market.  And they modeled the impact on transaction prices 
caused by the size of captive supply inventories from which future deliveries could be made.  
Transaction data were collected from the 43 largest steer and heifer slaughtering plants, owned 
by 25 firms, for a one-year period, April 1992-April 1993.  They found that increasing deliveries 
of cattle from two of the three types of captive supply inventories were associated with lower 
transaction prices for fed cattle.  A 1% increase in captive supply deliveries, measured in 
percentages, was associated with a $0.05/cwt. decline in fed cattle transaction prices for forward 
contracted cattle and a $0.36/cwt. decline for marketing agreement cattle.  Simultaneity was 
found between cash market transaction prices and percentage deliveries of forward contracted 
and marketing agreement cattle.  Coefficients on individual captive supply inventory variables 
had mixed signs while the coefficient on the total captive supplies variable was not significant.  
A 1,000 head increase in the size of captive supply inventory was associated with: a $0.01/cwt. 
increase in transaction prices for the forward contract inventory; an $0.18/cwt. decline for the 
packer fed inventory; and a $0.02/cwt. decline for marketing agreement inventory. 
 Love and Burton also developed a strategic rationale for backward integration by packers into 
livestock production or feeding.  Their model included various forms of captive supplies.  Two 
sources of gains were identified.  First, a dominant firm benefits from efficiency gains associated 
with expanded production.  Second, the integrating firm pays a lower price in their model for 
captive supply purchases. Love and Burton argued their results were consistent with previous 
research, i.e. the Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder findings.  Love and Burton concluded that use of 
captive supplies by beefpackers can be a potential source of market power.  However, they note 
that market power exertion may not be the prime motive for vertical integration. 
 
Schroeter and Azzam (1999) used similar GIPSA data to the that used in the Ward, Koontz, and 
Schroeder study to examine the price and captive supplies relationship.  The Schroeter and 
Azzam study had access to less transaction data, i.e., from only four plants in the Texas 
Panhandle region, but it covered a more recent period, February 1995-May 1996 compared to 
previous work.  They found that packers expecting relatively large deliveries of non-cash-market 
cattle, paid lower prices in the cash market.  However, the magnitude was small.  A 10% 
increase in captive supply deliveries was associated with a $0.02-0.04/cwt. lower price.  They 
stated their findings were generally consistent with previous studies and provided a rationale for 
this relatively consistent finding, cautioning that the negative relationship is not necessarily 
causal in nature nor a sign of non-competitive behavior by packers. 
 
Zhang and Sexton employed a spatial model to illustrate how meatpackers can use captive 
supplies strategically to influence cash market prices.  Their model hinges on the importance of 
space to processors, i.e., relative shipping costs to product value.  As the importance of space 
increases, the more likely meatpacking firms will create a geographic buffer between their plant 
and competing plants which reduces competition in the cash market.  
   
Data and Models Estimated 
The second question addressed in this research relates to the impacts on cash market prices from 
captive supplies using MPR data.  Schroeder et al. (1993) developed a conceptual model leading 
to an empirical model for estimating the cash market price impacts from forward contracting 
(including marketing agreements).  They estimated the impacts using transaction price data.  
Their conceptual model can be extended to include all methods of procuring fed cattle.  They 
used primary data for fed cattle transactions, whereas this study uses weekly, publicly reported 
data.  Weekly data imposes limitations on price-influencing data for individual transactions but 
also aggregates certain data, holding some factors constant within and between weeks.  Weekly 
data began the week ending April 8, 2001 and ended the week ending April 27, 2003. 
 
The basic, derived demand model estimated is shown in equation 1.  Several variations of the 
model were estimated and variables in equation 1 for models reported here are described in 
Table 2.  
 
(1)  Pricet = f (BoxBft,1, SlWtt, QNegott, QFormt, QFwdCont, QPkrOwnt)  
 
where t is the current week. This derived demand specification assumes the weekly average cash 
market price depends on the previous week’s boxed beef cutout value, current week’s average 
slaughter weight, and reported quantities marketed for negotiated, formula priced, forward contracted, and packer owned trades.  Variations of this model included a specification without 
the quantity of negotiated trades, thus including only the three variables most nearly matching 
the definition of captive supplies.  In another version, quantities were replaced by percentages for 
each type of captive supply of total slaughter for the week. 
 
While equation 1 and all previous research assumes a linear relationship between price and each 
type of captive supplies, a quadratic relationship was hypothesized and estimated here.  Lastly, a 
set of regression equations similar to the above were estimated as a partial adjustment model, 
thus inserting a lagged dependent variable (Pricet-1) into equation 1.  Models were estimated by 
FGLS with Proc Reg in SAS to correct for first-order autocorrelation (SAS Institute); however, 
due to convergence problems only OLS estimates were available for the derived demand models.  
In total, six versions of a derived demand model and six versions of a partial adjustment model 
were estimated. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Regression results for selected models are shown in Table 3.  Generally, R
2’s were quite high, 
ranging from 0.866-0.897 for the derived demand models and 0.953-0.960 for the partial 
adjustment models.  Results were very robust for several variables across various specifications. 
 
The lagged dependent variable was positive and significant in all estimated models.  The 
previous week’s boxed beef variable was positive and significant in all derived demand models 
and significant but negative in all the partial adjustment models.  While the negative coefficient 
was unexpected, it may be related to the lagged dependent variable accounting for a large 
percentage of the variation in price.  Steer weight was negative and significant in all models as 
estimated. 
 
There was less robustness for some of the procurement method variables, yet considerable 
robustness for others.  A summary of signs and significance are shown in Table 4. 
•  Both linear forms of the quantity of negotiated traded fed cattle were positive and 
significant and in one of the two quadratic forms the first term was positive and the 
squared term negative. 
•  For the 12 models in which the variables quantity or percentage formula traded appeared, 
11 coefficients were negative and significant.  For the two quadratic models in which 
quantity marketed appeared, the first term was negative and the second negative.  
However, that was not the case for the two quadratic models using percentage formula 
traded. 
•  Relatively few of the forward contract variables were significant.  When they were, there 
was a positive relationship between quantity or percentage forward contracted and cash 
market prices.  The second term was negative for three of the six the quadratic models. 
•  About half of the packer owned variables had a positive coefficient, with a negative sign 
on the quadratic term in the percentage version.  
 
Thus, there was generally a positive, significant effect on cash market prices from increased use 
of negotiated trades, ranging from $0.09 to $0.16/cwt.  Note that these coefficients are associated 
with a 1,000 head or 1% increase in trades, depending on the model.  Similarly, there was a 
negative relationship between formula trades and cash market prices, ranging from -$0.14 to -$0.54/cwt.  Relatively few models showed a significant relationship between forward contracting 
and cash market prices.  However, in the few that did the relationships were positive, ranging 
from $0.36 to $0.72/cwt.  Positive effects on cash market prices were found for increasing packer 
owned trades also.  This was somewhat surprising but not as much as the coefficient sizes, 
ranging from $0.32 to $1.90/cwt. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This research had two objectives.  First was to determine if mandatory price reporting increased 
the amount of information available on captive supplies.  The quick answer is yes, but probably 
not to the extent many proponents of MPR had anticipated. 
 
Second was to estimate the impacts captive supplies have had on cash market prices in the two 
years since implementing MPR.  Models estimated showed both positive and negative effects 
from various types of pricing methods, both for negotiated trades and various types of captive 
supplies.  Net effects are difficult to determine.  Cash market impacts from negotiated trades 
were generally positive; and from formula trades, generally negative.  Negative coefficients for 
formula trades were similar to previous research for captive supplies.  Results from forward 
contract and packer owned trades were mixed but unexpectedly positive.  Positive impacts from 
increased packer owned trades were also larger than expected. 
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 Table 1. Summary Statistics, April 8, 2001-April 27, 2003 
_______________________________________          _       
 
     Mean   Std  dev Min   Max 
_     _______________________________________   ______ 
  
Weekly 5-State Weighted 
Average Liveweight Price ($/cwt.)   70.01    5.51     61.01     81.41 
 
Weekly Average Boxed Beef  
Cutout  Value  ($/cwt.)    118.32   7.92   106.25   135.72 
 
Weekly Average Fed Steer 
Weight (Lbs.)          1264      30        1191     1310 
 
Weekly Average Negotiated 
Trades  (Head)     178,529  39,811   87,069   303,729 
    
Weekly Average Formula    
Priced Trades (Head)     197,713  67,672   12,249   313,981 
 
Weekly Average Forward 
Contract Trades (Head)    13,908     6,925        516     6,671 
    
Weekly Average Packer 
Owned Trades (Head)     27,388     6,272   12,955   42,630 
 
Weekly Average Negotiated 
Trades  (Percent)    44.70   11.67   24.51   95.16 
    
Weekly Average Formula 
Priced  Trades  (Percent)   46.92   10.05   4.83   64.80 
   
Weekly Average Forward 
Contract Trades (Percent)      3.23      1.54    0.17      9.37 
 
Weekly Average Packer 
Owned Trades (Percent)      6.40      1.46    2.62    10.23 
 
________________________________________________        




Variable     Description    
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pricet    Five-state weighted average fed cattle price in week t ($/cwt) 
 
Pricet-1   Lagged five-state weighted average price ($/cwt) 
 
BoxBft-1  Average boxed beef cutout value, lagged one week, for Choice YG1-3 550-700 
lb. carcasses ($/cwt) 
 
SlWt1    Five-state weighted average fed cattle weight in week t (lbs.)  
 
QNegott  Quantity of reported negotiated trades in week t (head)  
 
QNegot2t   Square of the quantity of negotiated trades (head)  
 
QFormt  Quantity of reported formula priced trades in week t (head)  
 
QForm2t   Square of the quantity of formula priced trades (head) 
 
QFwdCont  Quantity of reported forward contract trades in week t (head)  
 
QFwdCon2t   Square of the quantity of forward contract trades (head) 
 
QPkrOwnt  Quantity of reported packer owned trades in week t (head)  
 
QPkrOwnt   Square of the quantity of packer owned trades (head) 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 




Variable     Partial Adjustment       Derived Demand 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept    46.798***      61.990*** 
    (3.88)     (3.18)     
 
Pricet-1     0.834**        NA 
   (11.40)   
  
BoxBft-1      -0.086*      0.339***   
    (1.80)     (7.14)   
  
SlWtt       -0.020***        -0.030**     
    (2.76)     (2.63) 
   
QNegott    0.000038      0.000101** 
    (1.34)       (2.32)       
 
QNegot2t    -7.68E-11      -2.37E-10* 
    (0.98)       (1.95)       
 
QFormt   -0.000064***      -0.000070*** 
    (3.88)       (2.63)       
 
QForm2t    9.84E-11**      4.36E-11 
    (2.54)       (0.70)       
 
QFwdCont    0.000054      0.000324** 
    (0.66)       (2.56)       
 
QFwdCon2t    -1.71E-9      -8.91E-9*** 
    (0.80)       (2.70)       
 
QPkrOwnt    0.000240      0.000352 
    (1.53)       (1.44)       
 
QPkrOwnt    -3.08E-9      -4.08E-9 
    (1.09)       (0.92)       
 
n           79             81 
R
2      0.956           0.897 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of calculated t statistics; *=0.10, **=0.05, and 
***=0.01 significance level. Table 4. Summary of Pricing Method Variables  
_______________________________________          _       
 
Variables      Models in which  Signs and 
it appears    significance 
_     _______________________________________   ______ 
 
Negotiated Trades   
QNegott    4      3+   
QNegot2t    2    1-   
 
Formula Priced Trades 
QFormt         8      8- 
QForm2t         4    2+ 
%Formt         4      3- 
%Form2t         2    0 
 
Forward Contracted Trades 
QFwdCont    8    2+ 
QFwdCon2t       4    2- 
%FwdCont       4    1+ 
%FwdCon2t       2    1- 
 
Packer-Owned Trades 
QPkrOwnt       8    5+ 
QPkrOwnt    4     0  
%PkrOwnt       4    4+ 
%PkrOwnt    2    1- 
________________________________________________        
 
 Figure 1. Weekly Estimate of the Percentage of 
Captive Supplies vs. Negotiated Sales since MPR, April 
2001 to April 2003
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